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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the number of claims for mental injuries resulting
from work-related emotional stress has increased dramatically.1 In
1. 1B A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.25 (a)(1987 & Supp.
1989), states "The most lively development in compensation law in the last 15
years has been the explosion of 'stress claims.'" Larson recognizes three catego-
ries of employee mental injury and disorder cases: (1) physical-mental cases
which involve an injury to the physical structure of the body, resulting in a
mental injury to the employee (such as a back injury that does not improve be-
cause of emotional tension arising from the original accident); (2) mental-physi-
cal cases where a work-related accident or occurrence causes an employee to
suffer mental distress which causes a physical injury to the employee (such as a
sudden fright that results in a heart attack); and (3) mental-mental cases involv-
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1980, only 4.7 percent of workers' compensation cases dealt with em-
ployees seeking benefits for mental disorders caused by job stress.2
Today, the number of these so-called "mental-mental" cases has more
than tripled and continues to grow.3
Experts cite various reasons for the explosion in mental-mental
workers' compensation claims. First, the complications of contempo-
rary life and mechanized workplaces have increased mental stress on
the job.4 Second, industrial psychologists have heightened the aware-
ness of mental stress in the workplace.5 Third, the increasing number
of two-wage-earner families has contributed to mental stress injuries.
As more women enter the workforce, the burdens of child-rearing,
household duties, and job responsibilities fall on both men and wo-
men.6 Fourth, medical advances have led to better diagnosis and un-
derstanding of mental-mental injuries.7 Finally, the dissipation of the
stigma once associated with mental problems appears to have in-
creased mental-mental claims.8
In 1988, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered a claim for
mental stress compensation in Sorensen v. City of Omaha.9 Ignoring
precedents from more than 25 states allowing compensation for
mental injuries caused by mental stress in the workplace,0 the court
ing work-related accidents or occurrences resulting in employee stress that
causes a mental injury or disorder to the employee (such as job stress that leads
to a nervous breakdown). Id. at §§ 42.20 to 42.23. This Comment focuses on
mental-mental claims.
2. Blodgett, Legal Relief from Tension: Work-Induced Stress Spurs Workers' Comp
Claims, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1986, at 17. See also A. LARSON, supra note 1, at
§ 42.25(a).
3. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.25(a). A research study by the California Work-
ers' Compensation Institute estimated that the number of mental-mental claims
in California may be as much as ten times greater than the 6,812 claims reported
in 1986. Thus, the number of claims may be as high as 70,000, accounting for 17
percent of lost-time injuries. See also Landess, Stress: How It's Straining the
Workers' Compensation System, THE BRIEF, Fall 1987, at 17. The National Coun-
cil on Compensation Insurance, which monitors workers' compensation claims in
32 states, reported that mental-mental claims have increased five fold in the last
five years, but still account for less than 1 percent of all compensation claims.
Wall Street J., Dec. 20, 1988, at Al, col. 5.
4. Blodgett, supra note 2, at 17.
5. Id.
6. Interview with John M. Gradwobl, Ross McCollum Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska College of Law, Lincoln, Nebraska (Dec. 20, 1988).
7. See generally Landess, supra note 3, at 18. AMERICAN PSYCHATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter DSM-lI]. See also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOS-
TIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS-REviSED (3d ed. rev. 1987).
8. Gradwohl, supra note 6. See also A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.20.
9. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 430 N.W.2d 696 (1988).
10. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.25(c).
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denied relief based on Nebraska's statutory definition of "injury.""
Nebraska's statute requires that a claimant suffer harm to the "physi-
cal structure of the body"12 to recover workers' compensation
benefits.
This Comment will examine the feasibility of allowing workers'
compensation benefits for plaintiffs claiming mental-mental injuries.
In Part II, this Comment will address the origin of workers' compen-
sation in Nebraska and will evaluate Nebraska's denial of relief for
mental-mental injuries. In Part III, this Comment will explore causa-
tion and workers' compensation decisions from other jurisdictions and
will contrast the majority and minority positions. In Part IV, this
Comment will address various rules of statutory construction and in-
terpretation and will apply such rules to present workers' compensa-
tion statutes. Furthermore, mental-mental injuries will be compared
with tort and heart attack cases in an effort to show their similarity
and how recovery for mental-mental injuries would be consistent with
public policy. Finally, this Comment will propose a statutory compro-
mise to provide limited relief for workers who can prove an injury
while guarding against fraudulent claims. The statutory compromise
would better serve the purposes of workers' compensation law by de-
veloping rules of fact to consider mental-mental claims, rather than
the present rule of law barring all mental-mental claims whether or
not the employee can prove an injury. Under the proposed rule of fact
approach, courts could evaluate mental-mental claims on a case-by-
case basis and generally could leave the loss on the employee, unless
the employee could prove a mental stimulus in the workplace substan-
tially contributed to the mental injury.
II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW IN NEBRASKA
A. Background
Nebraska first passed a workers' compensation act in 1913.13 Ne-
braska was among the first wave of states to enact workers' compensa-
tion legislation similar to worker protections offered in England.14
Workers' compensation represented a compromise between employers
and employees. Both parties waived their common law tort rights in
exchange for more certain legislative remedies.15
Before the enactment of workers' compensation law, injured work-
11. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 289-91, 430 N.W.2d 696, 698-99 (1988).
See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151 (1988).
12. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 289-91, 430 N.W.2d 696, 698-99 (1988).
See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-151 (1988).
13. NEB. REV. STAT. § 3642 (1913).




ers could recover only through tort law. Tort remedies, however,
often were inadequate because employers could avoid liability through
the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and
the fellow-servant rule.16 As a result, workers and their families bore
most of the costs of workplace injuries.17 Nebraska' s and several
other states recognized the need for workers' compensation with the
rise of the industrial revolution.19 Under the fixed compensation sys-
tem, states spread the cost of worker injuries throughout an industry,
rather than on a single worker and his family.
20
Although Nebraska has amended its workers' compensation law
several times, the statute still serves as the exclusive remedy for
workplace injuries. 21 Nebraska courts continually recognize that
workers' compensation law was designed to place the cost of work-
place injuries on industries and their customers, rather than on indi-
vidual workers22 or the public.23  In addition, the workers'
compensation act helps employees avoid tedious legal disputes with
their employers.24 Most importantly, courts recognize that the work-
ers' compensation act must be construed broadly25 to accomplish its
purposes and to keep up with changes in the workplace.
B. Statutory and Case Law
Nebraska statutes indicate that workers' compensation will be
made "[w]hen personal injury is caused to an employee by accident or
occupational disease, arising out of and in the course of his or her em-
ployment .... 2 6 The statute further defines injury as "only violence
to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infection as
naturally results therefrom."27 Occupational disease refers to "only a
disease which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic
of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, process or employ-
ment and shall exclude all ordinary diseases of life to which the gen-
16. r- Under the fellow-servant rule, workers could not sue their employers for in-
juries caused by the negligence of fellow workers.
17. See id.
18. A. LARSON, su i a note 1, at § 5.30.
19. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 5.20.
20. I&
21. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-101 (1988).
22. See Tralle v. Hartman Furniture & Carpet Co., 116 Neb. 418, 423, 217 N.W. 952,
954 (1928)(stating that the purpose of workers' compensation law is to shift the
burden of economic loss from the employee to the industry).
23. Hayes v. McMullen, 128 Neb. 432, 435, 259 N.W. 165, 167 (1935).
24. Beideck v. Acme Amusement Co., 102 Neb. 128, 131, 166 N.W. 193, 194 (1918).
25. Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 659, 4 N.W.2d 741, 743 (1942). See also
Union Packing Co. v. Klauschie, 210 Neb. 331, 336, 314 N.W.2d 25, 29 (1982).
26. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-101 (1988).
27. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-151(4)(1988).
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eral public is exposed."28
Because of the statutory "physical injury" requirement, Nebraska
does not recognize mental-mental claims. Nebraska has not yet ad-
dressed the issue of mental-physical cases, but the state has allowed
compensation for physical-mental claims since 1944.29
In Lee v. Lincoln Cleaning & Dye Works,30 the plaintiff received a
severe and painful shock while ironing a garment. Experts testifying
at the trial stated that the employee suffered nerve damage to her
right shoulder, arm, and hand. In addition, she experienced hysteria,
neurosis, and mental disabilities. The district court set aside an award
for the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed, alleging that the district court
erred in refusing to "follow the long-established rule of our Supreme
Court and the statutes of the state of Nebraska which provide for a
liberal interpretation of the evidence in compensation cases." 31 The
Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mental injury
was compensable if it was the proximate result of a physical injury
and if it results in a disability.32
In more recent cases, Nebraska has continued to allow recovery for
physical-mental injuries. The Nebraska Supreme Court now, how-
ever, appears to require more proof of causation and disability than
under Lee.3 3 Thus, Nebraska will allow workers' compensation bene-
fits for mental injuries, but only if evidence proves that the mental
problems resulted from a physical injury.3 4 The Nebraska Supreme
Court, however, demands strict proof of causation and disability to
avoid fraudulent claims by "malingering" workers.35
28. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(3)(1988).
29. See Lee v. Lincoln Cleaning & Dye Works, 145 Neb. 124, 15 N.W.2d 330 (1944).
30. 145 Neb. 124, 15 N.W.2d 330 (1944).
31. Id at 127, 15 N.W.2d at 332.
32. Id at 138, 15 N.W.2d at 336.
33. See Kaufman, Compensability of Mental Injury, Workers' Compensation: a semi-
nar presented by Nebraska Continuing Legal Education, Inc., 1988. See also Car-
denas v. Peterson Bean Co., 180 Neb. 605, 144 N.W.2d 154 (1966)(an employee
must show that neurosis is the proximate result of his injury and that it results in
a disability); Davis v. Western Elec., 210 Neb. 771, 317 N.W.2d 68 (1982)(compe-
tent medical testimony must show a causal connection between the alleged in-
jury, the employment, and the psychological disorder); Van Winkle v. Electric
Hose & Rubber Co., 214 Neb. 8, 332 N.W.2d 209 (1983) (employees must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that their mental disabilities resulted from a
work-related accident).
34. The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court has recognized the physical-mental
recovery principal. See Barfield v. On-Time Freight Sys., Neb. Workers' Comp.
Ct., Docket 77, No. 165 (March 8, 1988); Cozart v. Omaha Pub. Schools, Neb.
Workers' Comp. Ct., Docket 77, No. 14 (Sept. 3, 1987); Elliott v. Midlands Animal
Prods., Neb. Workers' Comp. Ct., Docket 75, No. 61 (Aug. 31, 1987); Newman v.
Asarco, Inc., Neb. Workers' Comp. Ct., Docket 75, No. 360 (May 21, 1987); Hense
v. Square D Co., Neb. Workers' Comp. Ct., Docket 74, No. 301 (Feb. 27, 1987).
35. In workers' compensation cases, malingering generally involves deception, prac-
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In contrast, Nebraska has never allowed recovery for a mental-
mental claim. In a case of first impression, a divided Nebraska
Supreme Court denied a claim for mental injury caused by a mental
stimulus in Bekelski v. 0. F. Neal Co.36 The Bekelski plaintiff suffered
shock after she was trapped in an elevator with a passenger who was
crushed to death between floors. The court refused to award workers'
compensation benefits, stating that although the plaintiff suffered
shock to her nervous system, lost control of her emotions, and spent
several days in the hospital, the injuries did not constitute violence to
the physical structure of the body.37
The Bekelski court followed a three-part test for workers' compen-
sation claims. To recover benefits, employees had to prove (1) an un-
expected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently;38 (2)
producing at the time objective symptoms of injury;39 and (3) violence
to the physical structure of the body.40
In considering the claim of the Bekelski plaintiff, the court ac-
knowledged that the primary purpose of the workers' compensation
act is to insure employees against accidental injuries arising out of and
in the course of employment. Further, the court stated that the work-
ers' compensation act should be liberally construed, not strictly
interpreted.41
Despite its recognition of workers' compensation policy, the major-
ity strictly construed Nebraska's "injury" statute to require physical
harm to the body.42 The court relied in part on a Texas decision,
Southern Casualty Co. v. M7ores,4 3 which interpreted a statute similar
to Nebraska's to require "harm or damage to the physical structure of
the body."44
In a strong dissent, Judge Rose argued for a traditional reading
ticed by a dishonest employee who feigns, induces, or prolongs sickness or injury
to receive illegal or fraudulent workers' compensation payments. Lee v. Lincoln
Cleaning & Dye Works, 145 Neb. 124, 136, 15 N.W.2d 330, 335 (1944).
36. 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942).
37. Id. at 658-61, 4 N.W.2d at 742-44.
38. Id. at 658, 4 N.W.2d at 742-43. In 1963, the Legislature amended NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-151 to eliminate the requirement that the event happen suddenly and vio-
lently. Instead, the revised statute requires that the injury arise out of and in the
course of employment. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151 (1988). The statute excludes
compensation for disabilities and death resulting from natural causes. For a de-
tailed analysis of the statutory amendment, see Gradwohl, Workmen's Compen-
sation: An Analysis of Nebraska's Revised "Accident" Requirement, 43 NEB. L.
REV. 27 (1963).
39. Bekelski v. 0. F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 658, 4 N.W.2d 741, 741-43 (1942).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 659, 4 N.W.2d at 743.
42. Id. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151 (1988).
43. 1 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Com. App. 1928).
44. Id. at 263.
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supporting the purposes of workers' compensation law - to protect
employees. Judge Rose recognized that a worker can be harmed as
much by a mental injury as by a physical injury. Because the brain
and nervous system are part of the body, Judge Rose argued, mental
injuries should be considered physical injuries to the body.45
The statutory construction arguments of the Bekelski majority
carry little weight in certain states that traditionally allowed workers'
compensation claims only where plaintiffs demonstrated physical in-
jury. Two states with "physical" injury statutory definitions46 allow
limited relief in mental-mental cases despite the literal wording of
their statutes. The Texas Supreme Court allowed relief in a mental
stress case despite its physical injury statute in a landmark 1955 deci-
sion. In Bailey v. American General Insurance Co.,47 the plaintiff
watched a co-worker plunge to his death when a scaffold collapsed.
The plaintiff thought he also would be killed, but he was caught in a
cable and managed to jump safely to the roof. Because of the accident,
the plaintiff could no longer function as a steel worker. He would
blank out at heights, his blood pressure was high, and he experienced
violent nightmares.
The Texas court ruled that "physical" structure involves an entire
interrelated, living, functioning organism. The court determined that
because the employee's body no longer functioned properly, he had
suffered the required physical injury.48 Bailey followed the position
of the dissent in Bekelski. Nebraska's dissenting Judge Rose stated:
[T]he claim of plaintiff is clearly within the purposes of the workmen's com-
pensation law, if not within its terms.... I am inclined to think that the
lawmakers, by the use of the term "violence to the physical structure of the
body," meant an animate body with a directing brain containing blood, sensi-
tive nerves, fibers and convolutions.
4 9
Despite the contrary (but now restricted) precedent in Texas, the
Nebraska Supreme Court reaffirmed Bekelski in the 1985 case of
Johnston v. State.5 0 In Johnston, the plaintiff was a secretary to Ne-
braska Supreme Court Judge Donald Brodkey. Mrs. Johnston ob-
tained what she thought was a cup of coffee from the statehouse
cafeteria. Instead, she received urn cleaner, which caused minor es-
ophageal and gastric problems. In addition, Mrs. Johnston exper-
ienced panic attacks, anxiety, and depression because of the accident.51
45. Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 662, 4 N.W.2d 741, 744 (1942).
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301 (1985); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 § 20
(Vernon Supp. 1990).
47. 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
48. 1& Texas has since limited its mental-mental claims to only cases involving a
"sudden" mental stimulus.
49. Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 662, 4 N.W.2d 741, 744 (1942).
50. 219 Neb. 457, 364 N.W.2d 1 (1985).
51. Id at 459, 364 N.W.2d at 3.
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The court allowed relief, stating that "[t]here can be no question
that Mrs. Johnston suffered an injury, no matter how slight, when she
ingested the urn cleaner."5 2 The court further stated that workers can
recover compensation for neurosis only if it is a proximate result of
their physical injuries resulting in a disability.53
Three years later, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered Soren-
sen v. City of Omaha.54 In Sorensen, the plaintiff, James H. Sorensen,
had served for 21 years as a firefighter for the City of Omaha. Soren-
sen, age 43, passed the captain's examination and in January 1986 be-
gan a six-month probationary period as acting captain.55 On June 26,
1986, Sorensen reported in full-dress uniform for what he assumed to
be a promotion ceremony.5 6 Instead, Sorensen was demoted for al-
leged poor work performance.57 Sorensen protested the demotion,
and his supervisors granted a second six-month probationary period.58
After the demotion, family doctors treated Sorensen for "consider-
able stress at work and epigastric problems with nausea and abdomi-
nal pain."5 9 In addition, a psychologist treated Sorensen for job-
related stress.60 Approximately two months into the second proba-
tionary period, Sorensen left his job because of "harassment," "pres-
sure," and "stress" caused by his failure to be promoted and his
treatment by supervisors during the probationary periods.6 '
On January 2, 1987, Sorensen filed a petition in the Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Court for stress-related physical and mental
injury in the course of his employment. The Workers' Compensation
Court agreed that "while engaged in the duties of his employment
[Sorensen] suffered gastritis and injury to his psyche as a result of an
accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his
employment by the defendant." 62 The court awarded medical ex-
penses and temporary disability compensation to Sorensen.
52. Id. at 466, 364 N.W.2d at 7.
53. Id.
54. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 430 N.W.2d 696 (1988).
55. Id. at 287, 430 N.W.2d at 697.
56. Brief for Appellant at 4, Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 430 N.W.2d 969
(1988)(No. 88-130).
57. Brief for Appellee at 3, Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 430 N.W.2d 696
(1988)(No. 88-130). Sorensen was told that he would not be confirmed as a cap-
tain because of his poor work performance, of which he had been warned on sev-
eral occasions, and because of the recommendations of his supervisors.
58. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 287, 430 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1988).
59. Brief for Appellant at 5, Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286,287, 430 N.W.2d
696, 697 (1988)(No. 88-130). Sorensen specifically suffered from stomach pain,
nausea, vomiting, psychomotor retardation, insomnia, and rectal bleeding. Soren-
sen v. City of Omaha 230 Neb. 286, 287, 430 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1988).
60. Id.
61. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 287, 430 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1988).
62. Id. at 288, 430 N.W.2d at 697.
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On rehearing, a three-judge panel of the Workers' Compensation
Court reversed the award. The panel relied on the Nebraska statute
defining "injury" as harm "to the physical structure of the body."63
The panel stated: "Plaintiff's primary complaints are emotional....
The Nebraska Supreme Court has consistingly [sic] held that in order
for a mental or nervous injury to be compensable it must arise from
violence to the physical structure of the body."64
Sorensen appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court claiming he
suffered an accidental injury as defined by Nebraska law. In the origi-
nal petition before the Workers' Compensation Court, Sorensen's at-
torney characterized the claim as a mental-mental injury, indicating
that Sorensen had suffered a mental injury because of stress on the
job.65
On appeal, however, Sorensen's attorney urged the court to charac-
terize Sorensen's injury as a mental-physical claim, which occurs
when a mental stimulus results in a distinct physical injury6 6 (such as
a sudden fright resulting in a heart attack).67 To recover for a mental-
physical injury, a plaintiff must prove (1) a mental stimulus (2) result-
ing in a distinct physical injury.6 8 Nebraska courts have not directly
addressed claims for mental-physical injuries, and the court again re-
fused to do so in Sorensen. Instead, the court considered Sorensen's
claim a mental-mental claim.69
Affirming the decision of the rehearing panel, the Nebraska
Supreme Court denied Sorensen's claim for workers' compensation.
The court based its decision on Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co.,70 which re-
quired employees to prove actual physical injuries to recover workers'
compensation benefits.73
The Sorenson court determined that the plaintiff failed to prove
the third element of the test - violence to the physical structure of
the body. Therefore, the court declined to address the first two ele-
ments.72 Strictly construing the "injury" definition, the court indi-
cated that Sorensen
had to produce at least some minimal evidence of actual physical injury, exter-
63. Id. See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-151 (1988).
64. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, Neb. Workers' Comp. Ct., Docket 76, No. 403, at 3
(January 15, 1988).
65. The type of injury Sorenson claimed would be defined by Professor Arthur Lar-
son as a "mental-mental" injury. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.23.
66. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 290, 430 N.W.2d 696, 698 (1988).
67. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.21(b).
68. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 290, 430 N.W.2d 696, 698 (1988).
69. I&
70. 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942).
71. I& at 661, 4 N.W.2d at 744.
72. However, the court did state that Sorensen's injuries clearly met the second re-
quirement of objective symptoms of injury. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb.
286, 289, 430 N.W.2d 696, 698 (1988).
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nal or internal.... Common sense tells us that appellant's ailments were
probably the products of physical injury, possibly an ulcer, but the appellant
has failed to meet his evidentiary burden showing an actual injury such as a
minimal superficial erosion of the lower esophagus.
7 3
The court ignored a strong dissent by Judge Rose in Bekelski.
Judge Rose had focused on the purpose of workers' compensation law
- protection of the worker - and favored a broad application of the
physical injury definition to include damage to the brain and nervous
system.74 Further, the court in Sorensen ignored medical advances
and social issues supporting recovery for mental-mental claims. In-
stead, the court relied on a rule of law barring all mental-mental
claims in Nebraska. 75
Bekelski, Johnston, and Sorensen do not further the purpose of
workers' compensation laws. The Nebraska Supreme Court acknowl-
edges that workers' compensation laws should be construed to benefit
workers who can prove factually that a work-related stimulus caused
harm.76 Yet, the court continues to follow a minority position drawing
an arbitrary line between physical injuries and mental disorders,
rather than looking at the functions of the body as a whole. Instead of
denying all mental-mental claims through a rule of law, the court
should allow workers to present their cases through more equitable
rules of fact.
The arbitrariness of the physical injury requirement becomes even
more clear when Johnston and the more recent Sorensen case are con-
trasted. In Johnston, the plaintiff's physical injuries were relatively
minor throat pains and gastritis. The court noted that Johnston's inju-
ries were slight.77 Johnston's physical injuries arguably were not as
severe as those of the Sorensen plaintiff, who suffered from epigastric
pain, insomnia, stomach pain, nausea, vomiting, and rectal bleeding.78
Yet, only Johnston was allowed to recover because her injuries alleg-
edly met Nebraska's statutory physical injury requirement.79
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONS' TREATMENT OF MENTAL-
MENTAL CLAIMS
A. Causation
One major barrier to the recognition of mental-mental claims in-
73. Id at 290, 430 N.W.2d at 698.
74. Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 661-62, 4 N.W.2d 741, 744 (1942).
75. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 290, 430 N.W.2d 696, 698 (1988).
76. Bekelski v. 0. F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 659, 4 N.W.2d 741, 743 (1942).
77. "There can be no question that Mrs. Johnston suffered an injury, no matter how
slight, when she ingested the urn cleaner." Johnston v. State, 219 Neb. 457, 466,
364 N.W.2d 1, 7 (1985).
78. Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 287, 430 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1988).
79. NEa. REV. STAT. § 48-151 (1988).
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volves proof of causation. Workers' compensation statutes generally
require that an injury (1) arise out of employment and (2) be in the
course of employment.8 0 To be compensated for a mental-mental in-
jury, the employee generally must show that mental injury arose out
of employment. Problems arise when employees experience mental
stress from "mixed" causes. For example, the stress leading to the
injury may be a combination of personal stress and work-related
stress.
8 1
Among the twenty-five states recognizing mental-mental claims,
the laws regarding burden of proof and presumptions differ.82 In the
majority of strict states, such as Iowa, the worker has the burden of
proof.8 3 No presumptions exist to help establish injury or causation.
Further, although such statutes indicate that they should be liberally
construed, liberal construction applies only to the law, not to the evi-
dence.8 4 To prove that an employee was injured in the course of em-
ployment, the employee must show a causal link between the work
environment and the mental injury.8 5 Causation is especially difficult
in mental-mental cases because mental illnesses have various causes.8 6
Courts have developed tests for meeting the causation require-
80. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 6.10. See also Johnson v. Ramsey County, 424
N.W.2d 800, 805 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Cagle v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 106 Wash. 2d
911, 921, 726 P.2d 434, 439 (Wash. 1986)(allowed damages for emotional distress in
connection with wrongful termination because the injury was not covered by
workers' compensation since the termination did not occur while "acting in the
course of employment"). But see Russell v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722
F.2d 482, 494 (9th Cir. 1983)(tort actions for emotional distress not preempted by
workers' compensation laws); Flynn v. N.E. Tel. Co., 615 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (D.
Mass. 1985)(emotional distress arising out of employment is a "personal injury"
compensable under workers' compensation); Busse v. Gelco Express Corp., 678 F.
Supp. 1398, 1460 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
81. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 7.00. Larson divides risks causing injuries into four
categories: (1) risks distinctly associated with employment such as physical inju-
ries on the job site; (2) risks personal to the employee such as death from natural
causes; (3) neutral risks, which occur when the cause is unknown or extraordi-
nary; and (4) mixed risks, which involve a combination of personal and employ-
ment risks, such as when an employee with a weak heart suffers a heart attack
because of strain at work.
82. See Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers' Compensation Mental Disability
Cases: An Analysis, Solutions and a Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REV. 263, 289-304
(1983); Sersland, Mental Disability Caused by Mental Stress: Standards of Proof
in Workers' Compensation Cases, 33 DRAKE L. REv. 751, 758-96 (1983-84); Note,
Determining the Compensability of Mental Disabilities Under Workers' Com-
pensation, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 193, 206-19 (1981).
83. Briar Cliff College v. Campolo, 360 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1984)(claimants had to prove
by a probability, not a possibility, that some employment incident or activity
caused the death).
84. Landess, supra note 3, at 18.
85. Fox v. Alascom, Inc., 718 P.2d 977, 984 (Alaska 1986)(a link was needed between
employment and the injury for a presumption of compensability to arise).
86. See generally DSM-III, supra note 7, at 35-349.
[Vol. 69:842
MENTAL STRESS
ments in mental-mental workers' compensation cases: the subjective
causal test, once applied in Michigan;87 and the objective test, applied
by a majority of jurisdictions recognizing mental-mental claims.88 The
subjective causal test allows an employee to recover if the employee
"honestly perceived" that a mental injury occurred in the course of
employment.89 Michigan later amended its laws to prevent recovery
under the subjective test.90
In contrast, the objective test examines the type, duration, and in-
tensity of stress affecting the employee.91 Employees must show that
stress existed on the job and was a contributing cause of the mental
illness. 92 Within the objective test, courts are divided on the type of
stress required. One group requires that the stress be unusual or ex-
traordinary compared to the stress of everyday employment.9 3 A sec-
ond group allows compensation for mental-mental claims if the
mental injuries are caused by normal daily stress.94
The different standards of causation applied by the courts create
significant proof problems in mental-mental cases. In states currently
recognizing mental-mental claims, 95 courts have developed differing
approaches to causation in mental-mental cases. The following section
87. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.23(c), (d). See also Dezial v. Difco Laboratories,
Inc., 403 Mich. 1, 26, 268 N.W.2d 1, 13 (1978).
88. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.23(d), (e).
89. Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 403 Mich. 1, 26, 268 N.W.2d 1, 13 (1978)(the
court stated that the employee could recover even if he mistakenly believed the
illness was caused by a work-related injury.) See also Petersen v. SAIF Corp., 78
Or. App. 167, 171, 714 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1986) review denied, 301 Or. 193, 719 P.2d
1304 (1986)(worker's reaction to stressful events can be compensated even if the
worker's reaction is irrational.)
90. MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 418.301(2)(West Supp. 1990). See also McVey v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 160 Mich. App. 640, 408 N.W.2d 408 (1987), appeal denied, 429
Mich 640 (1987).
91. See Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 187, 190-193 (Wyo. 1986). See also
Pate v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 104 Pa. Commw. 481,483,522 A.2d
166, 169 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 611, 536 A.2d 1335 (1987), cert denied, 484
U.S. 1064 (1988).
92. Bell Tel. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 87 Pa. Commw. 558, 487
A.2d 1053, 1056-57 (1985).
93. See Sloss v. Industrial Comm'n, 121 Ariz. 10, 11-12, 588 P.2d 303, 304 (1978). In
addition, some states such as Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Illinois have held
that no mental or emotional disability caused by a bona fide personnel action such
as a transfer, promotion, demotion, or firing, is compensable because it is not an
unusual or extraordinary event. See A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.23(e).
94. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp. v. Lucas, 94 Or. App. 132, 134-35, 764 P.2d 235, 236
(1988). See also McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 296 Or. 145, 162-66,
675 P.2d 159, 169-72 (1983).
95. See LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.25(c) & n.9. The following states currently rec-
ognize mental-mental claims: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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examines the individual approaches states have adopted for dealing
with mental-mental claims.
B. Majority View
More than half of all states allow workers' compensation relief for
a mental disorder caused by a mental stimulus such as stress.96 How-
ever, the states allowing mental-mental claims disagree on the types
of compensable stress injuries. Stress compensation generally can be
96. See A. LARsON, supra note 1, at § 42.25(c) & n.9. See also Fox v. Alascom, Inc., 718
P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986); Brock v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Ariz. App. 95, 486 P.2d 207
(1971); Owens v. National Health Laboratories, Inc., 8 Ark. App. 92, 96, 648
S.W.2d 829, 830 (1983)(compensation denied for failure of proof); Clay v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 206 Cal. App. 3d 1181, 254 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1988); Al-
bertson's, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 131 Cal. App. 3d 308, 182
Cal. Rptr. 304 (1982); City of Aurora v. Industrial Comm'n, 710 P.2d 1122 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1985); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295 (Del Super. Ct. 1986),
appeal dismissed, 515 A.2d 397 (Del. 1986); Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor &
Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 53 Haw. 32, 38, 487 P.2d 278, 282 (1971); DeAdwyler
v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 1. 2d 106,427 N.E.2d 560 (1981)(claimant failed to estab-
lish proof of injury); Hansen v. Von Duprin, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1348 (Ind. App.
1986)(no compensation for stress due to claimant's oversensitivity), rev'd, 507
N.E.2d 573 (Ind. 1987)(claimant's oversensitivity is not relevant to claim); Yocum
v. Pierce, 534 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1976); Sparks v. Tulane Medical Center Hosp. &
Clinic, 537 So. 2d 276 (La. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 546 So. 2d 138 (La. 1989);
Pomerleau v. United Parcel Serv., 464 A.2d 206 (Me. 1983); Sargent v. Board of
Educ., 49 Md. App. 577, 433 A.2d 1209 (1981)(compensation for claustrophobic re-
action while on job); Kelly's Case, 394 Mass. 684, 477 N.E.2d 582 (1985); Carter v.
General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960); Brown & Root Con-
str. Co. v. Duckworth, 475 So. 2d 813 (Miss. 1985); Simon v. R. H. H. Steel Laun-
dry, Inc., 25 N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446 (1953), aff'd, 26 N.J. Super. 598, 98 A.2d
604 (1953) (exploding boiler caused permanent psycho-neurosis); Candelaria v.
General Elec. Co., 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470 (1986); Rackley v. County of Rensse-
laer, 141 A.D.2d 232, 535 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1988); Tudro v. New York City Dep't of
Sanitation, 117 A.D.2d 861,498 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1986)(death from heart attack due to
failure of city to expedite compensation benefits); Haydel v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 106 A.D.2d 759, 483 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1984)(mental distress upon seeing dis-
turbing information in personnel record was compensable); McGarrah v. State
Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 296 Or. 145, 675 P.2d 159 (1983), aff'd, 296 Or. 145, 675
P.2d 159 (1983); Shubert v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 110 Pa.
Commw. 137, 531 A.2d 1189 (Pa. 1987)(compensation denied for failure to prove
work related injury); Martin v. Rhode Island Public Transit Auth., 506 A.2d 1365
(R.I. 1986)(depression caused by harassment from co-worker was compensable);
Smith v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. 1986)(complaint dis-
missed for failure to state a claim); Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430,
279 S.W.2d 315 (1955); Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204,13 S.E.2d 291
(1941)(days out of work due to "shell shock" from exploding electrical motor at
work was compensable); Department of Labor & Indus. v. Kinville, 35 Wash.
App. 80, 664 P.2d 1311 (1983)(but claimant's psychiatric condition did not qualify
as a compensable injury under the WCA for failure to show it arose out of em-
ployment); Breeden v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 285 S.E.2d 398 (W. Va.
1981); International Harvester v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 116 Wis. 2d
298, 341 N.W.2d 721 (1983)(emotional disturbance resulting from seeing co-
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divided into three categories: (1) mental disorders compensable even
if the mental stimulus causing the injury was gradual and even if the
stress is not unusual compared to ordinary life or employment; (2)
mental disorders compensable only if the stress is unusual; (3) mental
disorders compensable only if the stimulus is sudden.97 A discussion
of these three types of workers' compensation follows.
1. Traditional Recovery for Mental-Mental Injuries
Traditional workers' compensation law allowed recovery for work-
related injuries regardless of whether the injury was caused by an ex-
traordinary accident or an occurrence in the ordinary course of em-
ployment. Applying traditional workers' compensation law to mental-
mental claims would allow compensation for mental injuries even if
the mental stimulus is gradual and even if the stress is not unusual
compared to everyday life in the workplace.98 The nine states99 cur-
rently following the traditional approach place little emphasis on the
worker totally splashed with molten metal was compensable under WCA); Baker
v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984).
Colorado amended its statute in 1986 to provide that claimants can recover for
mental stress only if they show by competent evidence that the stress was "proxi-
mately caused solely by hazards to which the worker would not have been
equally exposed outside the employment." CoLO. REv. STAT. § 8-41-
108(2.2)(1986).
In 1986, New Mexico amended its statute to read that 'physical impairment"
does not include impairment of function due solely to psychological or emotional
conditions. However, in 1987, New Mexico again amended its statute, dividing
injuries into physical impairment, primary mental impairment, and secondary
mental impairment. A primary mental impairment is:
[A] mental illness arising from an accidental injury arising out of and in
the course of employment when the accidental injury involves no physi-
cal injury and consists of a psychologically traumatic event that is gener-
ally outside of a worker's usual experience and would evoke significant
symptoms of distress in a worker in similar circumstances, but is not an
event in connection with disciplinary, corrective or job evaluation action
or cessation of the workers' employment ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-24 (1987).
In 1988, the Wisconsin legislature amended its definition of "injury" to ex-
clude any injury causing mental harm or emotional stress or strain without physi-
cal trauma arising from exposure to conditions to conditions or circumstances
beyond those common to occupational or nonoccupational life. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.01 (West Supp. 1990).
97. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.25(b).
98. Ia at § 42.25(g).
99. Fox v. Alascom, Inc., 718 P.2d 977,984 (Alaska 1986); Albertson's, Inc. v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 131 Cal. App. 3d 308, 182 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1982); Royal
State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 53 Haw. 32, 487 P.2d
278 (1971); Yocum v. Pierce, 534 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1976); Carter v. General Motors
Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960); Williams v. Western Elec. Co., 178
N.J. Super. 571, 429 A.2d 1063 (1981); McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund
Corp., 59 Or. App. 448, 651 P.2d 153 (1982), aff'd, 296 Or. 145, 675 P.2d 159 (1983);
University of Pittsburgh v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 49 Pa.
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causal connection between stress and the workplace. Instead, the
courts follow the general rule of workers' compensation law and de-
termine whether the employment contributed to the mental injury
disorder.
Statutory causation requirements pose the major problem for the
traditional approach.oo Most workers' compensation statutes indicate
that the injury must "arise out of" the employment.101 As a result,
some courts attempt to impose additional requirements, such as a
"physical injury" requirement,102 a "sudden/traumatic" event require-
ment,103 or an "objective (greater than usual) stress" requirement 0 4
to ensure that the job in fact caused the stress.
Courts adopting the traditional approach, however, avoid causation
problems by establishing a preliminary link between the employment
and the mental stress. In Fox v. Alascom, Inc.,105 the Alaska Supreme
Court acknowledged causation difficulties, but granted relief through
the fundamental principle of workers' compensation law - that the
act should be read liberally and that the employer takes the employee
"as he finds him."106 The Alaska court stated that once a preliminary
link between the employment and mental stress is established, the
claimant has a rebuttable presumption for compensation and need not
present substantial evidence that his job caused the mental
disorder.1O7
2. Recovery for Unusual Stress
A more restricted view of mental stress compensation allows re-
covery only if the stress is unusual, meaning greater than the stress of
everyday life or ordinary employment.108 The eleven states that have
Commw. 347, 405 A.2d 1048 (1979); Breeden v. Workmen's Compensation
Conma'r, 285 S.E.2d 398 (W. Va. 1981).
100. See Sersland, Mental Disability Caused by Mental Stress: Standards of Proof in
Workers' Compensation Cases, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 752 (1983-84).
101. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 6.10.
102. Id. at § 42.10.
103. Id. at § 42.25(e).
104. Id. at § 42.25(f).
105. 718 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986).
106. Id. at 982.
107. Id. at 984.
108. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 119 Ariz. 51, 54-55, 579 P.2d
555, 557-59 (1978); Owens v. Nat'l Health Laboratories, Inc., 8 Ark. App. 92, 96-98,
648 S.W.2d 829, 831 (1983); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 8-41-108 (1986); Chicago Bd. of
Educ. v. Industrial Comm'n, 169 Ill. App. 3d 459, 468-69, 120 Ill. Dec. 1, 7-8, 523
N.E.2d 912, 918, appeal denied, 122 Ill. 2d 571, 125 Ill. Dec. 213, 530 N.E.2d 241
(1988). Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Me.
1979)(In 1987, Maine amended its statute to allow employees to recover workers'
compensation benefits for stress considered extraordinary and unusual compared
to that of the average employee. The stress must be measured by objective stan-
dards, not employee perception. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39 § 51 (West 1989)).
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adopted the unusual stress test apparently hope to satisfy causation
requirements with the unusual stress requirement and to avoid malin-
gering, which occurs when workers feign unsubstantiated mental
injuries. 0 9
In Martin v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority,11o an em-
ployee recovered workers' compensation benefits for mental injuries
after he was harassed and abused by co-workers. The claimant, who
refused to participate in a work slow down designed to discredit his
supervisor, suffered from nervousness, anxiety, loss of appetite, and
sweatiness. The court held that the co-workers' intentional and mali-
cious harassment exceeded the normal stress in the workplace.11
Thus, the worker received compensation for his mental stress.
3. Recovery When the Stimulus is Sudden
The most restrictive mental-mental category limits recovery only
to cases involving a sudden mental stimulus," 2 such as shock or fright.
Six states1 3 currently allow recovery if the mental disorder is caused
Kelly's Case, 394 Mass. 684, 688-89,477 N.E.2d 582, 584-85 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-1-24 (1987)(New Mexico amended its state statute in 1987 to provide for "pri-
mary mental impairments," which are traumatic events that generally are
outside the worker's usual experience); Haydel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 106
A.D.2d 759, 760, 483 N.Y.S.2d 792, 793 (1984); Martin v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit
Auth., 506 A.2d 1365, 1371 (R.I. 1986); Stokes v. First Nat'l Bank, 298 S.C. 13, 17-
18, 377 S.E.2d 922, 924 (Ct. App. 1988); Department of Labor & Indus. v. Kinville,
35 Wash. App. 80, 89, 664 P.2d 1311,1316 (1983); Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department
of Indus. Labor & Human Relations 51, 56-58, 72 Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128, 130,
132-33 (1976); Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 187, 194 (Wyo.
1986)(claimant's disability not compensable for failure to show day-to-day stress
greater than that experienced by other workers in same or similar job). See also
COLO. Rnv. STAT. § 8-41-108 (1986); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-24 (1987).
In 1988, however, the Wisconsin legislature amended the statutory definition
of "injury" to exclude injuries causing mental harm or emotional stress or strain
without physical trauma arising from exposure to conditions or circumstances be-
yond those common to occupational or nonoccupational life.
109. See generally Annotation, Mental Disorders as Compensable under Workmen's
Compensation Acts, 97 A.L.R. 3D 161, 168 (1980 and Supp. 1990). In Sorensen, the
plaintiff arguably met the unusual stress test because his injuries were caused by
unusual problems not normally in the course of everyday employment.
110. Martin v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 506 A.2d 1365, 1368 (R.I. 1986).
111. Id.
112. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.25(e).
113. Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 563, 343 N.E.2d 913, 919 (1976);
General Motors Parts Div. v. Industrial Comm'n, 168 Ill. App. 3d 678, 687, 119 Ill.
Dec. 401, 411, 522 N.E.2d 1260, 1266 (1988)(claimant alleged mental disability that
developed over time and claimant failed to recover because no sudden, severe
emotional shock occurred); Sargent v. Board of Educ., 49 Md. App. 577, 586, 433
A.2d 1209, 1213 (1981); Brown & Root Constr. Co. v. Duckworth, 475 So. 2d 813,
815 (Miss. 1985); Jose v. Equifax, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1977)(action dis-
missed for failure to allege a claim arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment); Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 441, 279 S.W.2d 315, 322
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by a sudden mental stimulus. Courts adopting the narrow "sudden
stimulus" test base their decisions on causation requirements and the
need to discourage malingering.114
In Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Commission,"5 a worker fainted
and suffered from anxiety after pulling a co-worker's severed hand
from a machine. The court allowed recovery, stating that the worker
had suffered a mental disorder caused by a sudden shock arising from
her employment.116 Noting the broad purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, the court found no justification for a rule allowing compensation
for mental disabilities caused by minor physical injuries but denying
compensation if the same mental disorders were caused by a sudden
mental shock.13.
4. Conclusion
Although more than half of the states now recognize compensation
for mental-mental injuries, the jurisdictions still are unable to uni-
formly resolve problems such as causation, malingering, and eggshell
plaintiffs. Some states follow traditional workers' compensation prin-
ciples and allow recovery for gradual job stress," 8 while others allow
compensation only if the stress is extraordinary or unusual.119 De-
spite the differing remedies, the majority of states agree that mental-
mental claimants deserve some workers' compensation benefits.
B. Minority View
Despite the growing majority of states allowing recovery for a
mental disorder resulting from a work-related emotional problem, the
minority view denying compensation for mental-mental injuries con-
tinues to control in a few jurisdictions. The minority courts deny re-
covery based on narrow statutory definitions, despite medical
advances and public policy to the contrary. Nebraska is one of ten
states currently refusing compensation for mental-mental cases. 120
(1955); Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 210-11, 13 S.E.2d 291,293-94
(1941).
Texas has held that mental-mental cases are compensable only if the stimu-
lus is sudden. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.25(e) (citing Transportation Ins.
Co. v. Marksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1979), reh'g granted, 567 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979)).
114. Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913 (1976).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 567-68, 343 N.E. 2d at 919.
117. Id. at 564-65, 343 N.E.2d 917.
118. See supra note 99.
119. See supra note 108.
120. In one Alabama case, a worker sought relief for mental disabilities caused by
harassment and the discriminatory practices of her supervisors. The court denied
relief, stating that an "accident" requires an injury to the physical structure of
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Like Nebraska, the states denying relief generally base their decisions
on statutory definitions such as "injury,"' 2 ' "accident," 2 2 or "occupa-
tional disease." The courts cling to narrow statutory interpretations,
requiring proof of a physical impairment to the body.
Courts upholding the minority view rarely go beyond statutory def-
initions to consider public policy reasons for allowing workers' corn-
the body. Magouirk v. United Parcel Serv., 496 So. 2d 55 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986)(re-
lying on ALA. CODE § 25-5-1(8)(1986)).
In Sheppard v. City of Gainesville Police Dep't, 490 So. 2d 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986), a Florida police officer received relief for a nervous breakdown after a
scuffle with a combative bicyclist. The scuffle caused the officer to have flash-
backs of an incident 12 years earlier when he killed a man to save a fellow of-
ficer's life. The court found that the statutory physical injury requirement was
satisfied because the officer was grabbed by the bicyclist and badly bruised.
In Williams v. ARA Envtl. Servs., Inc., 175 Ga. App. 661, 334 S.E.2d 192 (1985),
a housekeeper sought compensation for an increased workload, which caused her
to suffer from depression and anxiety. The court denied recovery based on the
lack of a physical injury.
A Kansas Court denied recovery for mental distress in Followill v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 234 Kan. 791, 674 P.2d 1050 (1984). A maintenance worker had arrived
on the scene shortly after a friend and co-worker was crushed to death in a die
cast press. The worker suffered no physical injury, but needed psychotherapy
and was unable to continue working because of a fear of machinery. The court
denied recovery, stating that the Kansas Workers' Compensation Statute requires
a "change in the physical structure of the body... ." Id. at 795, 674 P.2d at 1053.
In Franklin v. Complete Auto Transit Co., 397 So. 2d 60 (La. Ct. App.
1981)(superceded by LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.10.21(7)(b)-(d)(West Supp. 1990)),
a truck driver sought workers' compensation benefits for extreme depression and
an uncontrollable fear of accidents. The trucker was in an earlier accident, which
killed the driver of the car and caused permanent brain damage to her child pas-
senger. The truck driver's psychological problems escalated when he nearly col-
lided with another car. The Louisiana court refused compensation based on
statutory language requiring injury to the physical structure of the body.
In Egeland v. City of Minneapolis, 344 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1984), a Minnesota
police officer sought compensation for stress-induced injuries including an ulcer
and chronic anxiety and depression. The Minnesota court allowed recovery for
the ulcer, but not for depression and anxiety because the officer had suffered no
physical injury. See also Johnson v. Paul's Auto & Truck Sales, Inc., 409 N.W.2d
506 (Minn. 1987).
In Erhart v. Great Western Sugar Co., 169 Mont. 375, 546 P.2d 1055 (1976), a
Montana Court denied an electrician recovery for a mental breakdown because
he had suffered no "external or internal physical harm."
In Mettes v. Transamerican Insurance Corp., 36 Ohio App. 3d 180, 521 N.E.2d
1138 (1987), the claimant was denied benefits for her psychiatric injury caused by
job stress because she experienced no contemporaneous physical trauma.
In Vernon v. Seven-Eleven Stores, 547 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1976), a convenience
store manager sought compensation for nervous disorders caused by his discharge
for failure to pass a polygraph test. The Oklahoma court denied benefits, stating
that the worker had sustained no accidental injury as required by the Oklahoma
statute.
121. ALA. CODE § 25-5-1 (1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-508 (Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-71-119 (1989).
122. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(18)(West Supp. 1990).
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pensation in mental-mental cases. In a recent case, the Alabama
Court of Appeals at least acknowledged the beneficent purposes of
workers' compensation. 2 3 However, the court ignored the broad pur-
poses of the act, basing its decision on a nineteenth-century defini-
tional approach to mental injuries.12 4
In addition, minority courts consistently ignore psychological ad-
vances and the need for the law to keep abreast of changes in other
fields.125 In 1984, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged medical
advances in psychology. The court stated:
[T]he evidence indicates that the injury sustained by [the worker] was real. It
was as disabling as many physical injuries. It occurred by accident. It arose
out of and in the course of his employment with respondent. But under our
construction of the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act, it was not a com-
pensable "personal injury."
1 2 6
Yet, the Kansas court chose to ignore the evidence of medical ad-
vances and leave the issue of compensation for mental problems, ab-
sent physical injury, to the Kansas legislature. 12 7
IV. TOWARD RECOVERY FOR CERTAIN MENTAL-MENTAL
INJURIES IN NEBRASKA
A. Statutory Construction
To understand the Nebraska Supreme Court's decisions in Bekel-
ski, Johnston, and Sorensen, Nebraska's laws of statutory construction
must be analyzed. The rules generally are complex and contradictory.
Thus, courts are often left to their own discretion.
Only one clear rule of statutory construction emerges in Nebraska
law: The courts must determine and follow legislative intent.128 The
factors for determining legislative intent vary. Courts first look to the
policy and purpose of the legislation.1 2 9 In addition, courts consider
the entire language of a statute in its plain, ordinary, and popular
sense. 30 As a secondary source, courts can examine legislative history
such as floor debates.131
Under some precedents, courts need not apply literal meanings to
123. Magouirk v. United Parcel Serv., 496 So. 2d 55, 58 (Ala. Ct. App. 1986).
124. 1& at 58.
125. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.23 & n.82. See also DSM-III, supra note 7; MEL-
TON, PETRILA, POYTHRSS & SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
COURTS § 10.02 (1987).
126. Followill v. Emerson Elec. Co., 234 Kan. 791, 795-96, 674 P.2d 1050, 1053 (1984).
127. 1&,
128. County of Lancaster v. Maser, 224 Neb. 566, 400 N.W.2d 238 (1987).
129. State v. Burnett, 227 Neb. 351, 417 N.W.2d 355 (1988).
130. State ex rel. Spire v. Pub, Employees Retirement Bd., 226 Neb. 176, 410 N.W.2d
463 (1987).
131. Spence v. Terry, 215 Neb. 810, 815, 340 N.W.2d 884, 887 (1983).
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words if the literal definitions do not further the purpose of the act. 32
However, other cases seem to contradict the "literal meaning" exclu-
sion, stating that a court cannot ignore plain, direct, and unambiguous
statutory language. 3 3
Statutory construction rules also indicate that if a statute enumer-
ates items to be controlled (or excludes items not affected by the stat-
ute), the statute will be construed to exclude all items not
mentioned.13 4 However, the implied exclusion can be overcome if the
legislature clearly indicated a contrary purpose.'33
Finally, when the court judicially construes a statute, the construc-
tion will be presumed correct if the legislature does not amend the
statute to alter the interpretation. 36 As a result, if the legislature
fails to respond to a court decision based on statutory interpretation,
the decision is presumed to correctly reflect legislative intent.
With regard to mental-mental injuries, courts first must look to the
plain language of the workers' compensation statute. According to the
statute, "The terms injury and personal injuries shall mean only vio-
lence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infec-
tion as naturally results therefrom."137 Second, the court must
determine the legislative intent of the workers' compensation act.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has acknowledged that the purpose of
workers' compensation is to insure employees against accidental inju-
ries arising out of and in the course of employment. 38 In addition, the
purpose of the act should be broadly construed, but should not impose
liability without required proof. 3 9
Under the rules of statutory construction, the court's main focus
should be legislative intent - insuring employees against accidental
injuries arising in the workplace. Nebraska's Supreme Court, how-
ever, appears to place more emphasis on a literal reading of the statute
and a duty to give plain meaning to all words in the statute.
To properly construe the workers' compensation statutes, the court
must examine the legislative intent of a 1963 statutory amendment
designed to modernize workers' compensation laws. In the 1963
amendment, legislators eliminated the requirement that an accident
be the result of a "slip, trip or fall."140 The amendment was intended
132. Worley v. City of Omaha, 217 Neb. 77, 348 N.W.2d 123 (1984).
133. State ex reL Douglas v. Herrington, 206 Neb. 516, 294 N.W.2d 330 (1980).
134. Nebraska City Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 201 Neb. 303, 267 N.W.2d 530 (1978).
135. Id
136. Erspamer Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Labor, 214 Neb. 68, 333 N.W.2d 646
(1983) (superseded by statute as stated in State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Saville,
219 Neb. 81, 361 N.W.2d 215 (1985)).
137. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151 (1988).
138. Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 659, 4 N.W.2d 741, 743 (1942).
139. Id-
140. See Gradwohl, supra note 38.
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to eliminate the unjust results of an external cause requirement for
recovery of workers' compensation benefits. Legislators noted the un-
just results for two workers who failed to meet the external cause re-
quirement. First, a police chief who struggled with an armed man and
afterward suffered a heart attack was denied compensation because he
did not slip, trip or fall. Second, a garbage collector who suffered neck
injuries was denied relief because the injury was caused by ordinary
work, not by an external cause. 141 Thus, the 1963 amendment elimi-
nated the unjust external cause requirement and provided relief for
workers who could prove an injury arising from employment.
The 1963 amendment and the legislative intent behind the amend-
ment suggest that employees who can show a mental-mental injury
arising substantially from employment should receive the opportunity
to prove the mental-mental injury, regardless of whether the worker
also suffers a physical injury. Rather than barring all mental-mental
claims, the court should note the legislative intent of the 1963 amend-
ment - aiding workers injured in the course of employment regard-
less of external causation. Although the legislature failed to discuss
the physical injury definition in the 1963 amendment, the legislative
intent behind the amendment clearly covers recognition of mental-
mental claims if the worker can prove a mental-mental injury. Thus,
the court and the legislature should allow workers a chance to prove
causation in mental-mental cases rather than barring all mental-
mental claims.
B. Public Policy
Several analogies exist between policy reasons for the legislature's
1963 amendment of the accident definition and the arguments favor-
ing recognition of mental-mental claims. Further, the analogies are
more clear when comparing the Nebraska Supreme Court's treatment
of mental injuries in tort cases and heart attack cases to the court's
treatment of mental-mental workers' compensation claims. During
the floor debate for the 1963 amendment, the themes of justice and
fairness to workers continually surfaced.142 Advocates of the amend-
ment questioned a rule allowing recovery only for workers who
"slipped, tripped, or fell," but not for those who suffered a heart at-
tack or back injury arising out of the employment.143 One speaker
also noted that Nebraska workers should have the same right to re-
cover workers' compensation benefits as workers in other states that
had eliminated the external cause requirement.144
141. MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, LB 497 & 498, April 17, 1963 (com-
ments by Senator Don McGinley).
142. Id (statement by Tom Kelley of Omaha).
143. Id (statement by Senator Don McGinley).
144. Id. (statement by Omaha lawyer Robert O'Connor).
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The policy concerns spurring the legislature's expanded definition
of "accident" also justify a broader definition of "injury." Unlike the
workers in 25 other states, Nebraska workers are denied recovery for
mental disorders caused by a mental stimulus in the workplace. Ne-
braska's "physical" injury distinction is arbitrary and unfair to work-
ers. A worker with mental disorders caused by a slight physical injury
can recover workers' compensation benefits. Yet, a worker with
mental disorders caused by a mental stimulus cannot recover benefits.
Courts rejecting claims for mental stress caused by a mental stimu-
lus generally rely on three basic arguments to deny recovery. First,
the courts cite the need to establish a direct causal link between the
mental disorder and the workplace.145 Second, the courts fear a flood
of fraudulent claims for mental injuries that are often more difficult
to analyze than physical injuries.146 Third, and often most impor-
tantly, courts rely on strict statutory construction rules, leaving any
statutory changes to the legislature.147
The causation argument carries little weight. The link between
mental disorder and stress in the workplace can be decided by the
finder of fact. Through discovery and evidence presented at trial, the
court can determine whether the claimant's stress was caused by the
work environment or by other non-employment factors or a combina-
tion of factors. Courts and legislatures could develop proof in fact re-
quirements for mental-mental cases rather than flatly barring all
claims.
Similarly, courts' fear of fraudulent claims can easily be dismissed.
Medical and legal experts generally agree that no valid distinction ex-
ists between physical and "nervous" injury.1 4s The law constantly
must adapt to advances in medicine and other areas of science. As
Larson states:
Perhaps, in earlier years, when much less was known about mental and ner-
vous injuries and their relation to "physical" symptoms and behavior, there
was an excuse, on grounds of evidentiary difficulties, for ruling out recoveries
based on such injuries, both in tort and workmen's compensation. But the
excuse no longer exists.
1 4 9
Ironically, although Nebraska clings to the "physical injury" causa-
tion requirement in workers' compensation, Nebraska abandoned the
physical injury requirement in tort cases. The court allowed compen-
sation for mental distress in the case of Rasmussen v. Benson.o5 0 In
Rasmussen, a dairy farmer unknowingly bought poison bran at a farm
sale and fed the bran to his dairy herd and other animals. The farmer
145. See cases cited supra notes 80-95. See also A. LARSON, supra note 1, at 42.23(d).
146. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at 42.24(c).
147. See supra notes 128-36.
148. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.23(a).
149. Id-
150. 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937).
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died from a "decompensated heart caused by emotional disturbance"
caused in large part by an unreasonable fear that dairy customers
would be injured by drinking milk from the poisoned cows.' 51
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Carter, joined by Judge Eberly, ar-
gued that the death was not proximately caused by the negligent sale
of the poison bran. Judge Carter further stated that the farmer's
death was not a foreseeable consequence of the sale and that the bran
seller owed no duty to the buyer for the mental distress.52
Despite the Nebraska Supreme Court's liberal tort interpretation,
Judge Carter's dissenting view has prevailed in workers' compensa-
tion cases. 153 Judge Carter wrote the majority opinion in Bekelski v.
0. F. Neal Co.,154 which established the rule that claimants must have
"violence to the physical structure of the body" to recover workers'
compensation benefits.155 Thus, while Nebraska tort law does not re-
quire physical impact, workers' compensation law, despite its broad
goal of protecting workers, requires physical impact for recovery in
mental stress cases.
Analogies also can be drawn between mental-mental claims and
heart attack cases. Rather than simply barring all heart attack claims
because of causation problems, the Nebraska Supreme Court has de-
veloped rules of fact for such cases.
When analyzing heart attack cases, the court allows recovery of
workers' compensation benefits if the evidence shows that the em-
ployment contributed in some material and substantial degree to
cause the injury.156 A pre-existing disease or condition does not bar
workers' compensation; however, a pre-existing problem enhances the
degree of proof needed to establish that the employment substantially
contributed to the injury.15 7
Thus, as in mental-mental cases, the primary issue in heart attack
cases is causation. Yet, despite the similar causative issue, the court's
approach to the two cases differs. In mental-mental claims, the court
bars all claims based on a rule of law. In contrast, in heart attack
cases, the employee has the chance to prove the injury arose out of
employment. The court has established no fixed formula to resolve
the causation issue. Instead, the court decides the issue based on the
151. 1&
152. Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 241, 280 N.W. 890, 894 (1938).
153. See also Gradwohl, Nebraska Workmen's Compensation for Aggravation of Pre-
existing Infirmities by Exertion or Strain, 41 NEB. L. REV. 101, 138-39 (1961).
154. 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942).
155. Id. at 661, 4 N.W.2d at 744.
156. Mann v. City of Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 319 N.W.2d 454 (1982)(evidence showed




facts of each case.158
The court has eased the causation burden slightly in heart attack
cases, ruling that the injury need not be caused by a single traumatic
event. Instead, the employment exertion must contribute in some ma-
terial and substantial degree to the cause of injury.15 9 Because similar
causation problems exist among heart attack and mental-mental cases,
the Nebraska Supreme Court could adopt a common approach in both
categories. Rather than barring mental-mental claims, the court could
allow claimants to attempt to prove causation through rules of fact.
The factual compromise generally would leave the loss on the worker,
unless the worker could prove workplace stress contributed materi-
ally and substantially to the mental injury.
V. A STATUTORY COMPROMISE
Public policy and the purposes of the workers' compensation law
mandate that Nebraska workers receive fair treatment regardless of
whether they suffer a minor physical injury or a serious mental in-
jury. States currently recognizing mental-mental claims have varying
statutory forms.160 Thirteen states allowing workers' compensation
for mental-mental injuries have statutes requiring that the injury
"arise out of and in the course of employment."6l The "arising out
of" statutes are inadequate because they are ambiguous and leave the
issue of mental stress compensation to the courts. Although thirteen
states have interpreted their unclear statutes to include mental-
mental claims, four jurisdictions with similar statutes1 62 have denied
relief in mental-mental cases.163 Thus, Nebraska would gain little by
adopting a statute defining an injury as merely a disorder "arising out
of or in the course of employment."
A second group of statutes allows recovery for mental-mental inju-
158. See Sellens v. Allen Products Co., 206 Neb. 506, 509, 293 N.W.2d 415, 417 (1980);
Reis v. Douglas County Hosp., 193 Neb. 542, 227 N.W.2d 879 (1975).
159. Crosby v. American Stores, 207 Neb. 251, 298 N.W.2d 157 (1980).
160. See infra notes 161-72.
161. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 11-9-102 (4)(1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-3 (1985); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.2 (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-6-1(e)(Burns Supp. 1990);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 67 (1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-3 (1989 Supp.); N.Y.
WORK. COMP. LAw § 2 (7)(McKinney 1965); On. REv. STAT. § 656.005 (1987); 77
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411 (Purdon 1990 Supp.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-2 (1989);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-102 (1989 Supp.); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-7 (1987); W. VA.
CODE § 23-4-1 (1990 Supp.).
162. ALA. CODE ANN. § 114-101 (Harrison 1990); 1MNN. STAT. § 176.011 (Supp. 1989);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 (Anderson 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 3
(West Supp. 1990).
163. Magouirk v. United Parcel Serv., 496 So. 2d 55 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); Johnson v.
Paul's Auto & Truck Sales, Inc., 409 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. 1987); Mettes v. Trans-
america Ins. Corp., 36 Ohio App. 3d 180, 521 N.E.2d 1138 (1987); Vernon v. Seven-
Eleven Stores, 547 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1976).
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ries, but statutorily limits recovery to cases involving a sudden sthnu-
lus' 64 (such as shock or fright) or unusual stress greater than the
normal tension all employees must face.165 The limitations imposed
by these states are similar to the traditional "physical" requirement of
courts in the minority jurisdictions. Legislatures generally adopt the
limitations to provide some assurance that the claims will be genuine
and that job stress actually caused the mental injury.
6 6
Several problems exist with the "sudden" stimulus statutory limi-
tation. The "sudden" limitation is arbitrary and unfair to workers.
Further, the "sudden" requirement does not guarantee the legitimacy
of claims, although it may help establish a causal link. Because Ne-
braska already has removed the "sudden" requirement from its work-
ers' compensation "accident" definition,167 the state should not again
adopt the arbitrary limitation in its "injury" definition.
If Nebraska legislators determine that mental-mental claims must
be limited, the more logical limitation would be to allow recovery only
in cases of "unusual or extraordinary" stress. The "unusual stress"
statutes provide some relief for workers, but do not unduly burden the
workers' compensation system. Workers cannot recover for the
stresses of everyday living caused by employment. In addition, the
"unusual stress" requirement provides some guarantees of claim legit-
imacy and causation.168 By adopting an unusual stress recovery stat-
ute, Nebraska could provide relief for some workers who have
suffered mental-mental injuries, yet maintain some assurance that
claims will be genuine and causally linked to job stress.
The traditional approach to workers' compensation suggests that
Nebraska adopt a statute providing for mental injuries contributed to
164. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.08.100 (1990).
165. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265 (Supp. 1989); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1043.01 (1983);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-108 (2.2)(1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 51 (1989);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-24 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.01 (West Supp. 1989).
Wisconsin's statute defines "injury" as "mental or physical harm" to an em-
ployee. However, in April 1988, Wisconsin deleted an additional clause stating
that: " 'Injury' includes mental harm or emotional stress or strain without physi-
cal trauma, if it arises from exposure to conditions or circumstances beyond those
common to occupational or nonoccupational life."
166. Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers' Compensation Mental Disability Cases:
An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REV. 263 (1983).
167. See Gradwohl, supra note 38.
168. In 1986, Colorado adopted a statute designed to ensure a causal connection be-
tween the mental injury and the employment stress. According to the statute, an
injury:
shall not be construed to include disability or death caused by or result-
ing from mental or emotional stress unless it is shown by competent evi-
dence that such mental or emotional stress is proximately caused solely
by hazards to which the worker would not have been equally exposed
outside the employment.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-108(2.2)(1986).
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by employment169 or for any harmful change in the human organism
arising out of the workplace.o70 However, broad mental-mental stat-
utes fail to deter fraudulent claims and allow a weak causal link be-
tween the job stress and the mental injury. In California, which
compensates gradual stress injuries so long as the workplace contrib-
uted to the stress, the number of stress claims significantly increased
during the last five years.17'
Despite causation problems, broad statutes protecting gradual
mental-mental injuries are within the spirit of workers' compensation
laws. Workers' compensation was designed to protect all employees,
regardless of their ability to handle normal workplace stress. Thus,
Nebraska's most rational approach would be to adopt a statute al-
lowing relief for mental injuries caused by mental stress if the worker
can meet proof of fact requirements established by the legislature and
the courts. The courts and the legislature should not simply block all
recovery for mental-mental claims. Instead, the state must establish
rules of fact and allow employees the opportunity to prove mental-
mental claims. The proof of fact approach would provide the neces-
sary guarantees of claim validity and causation.
Finally, Nebraska also should include a clause designed to protect
employers' right to continue normal business practices. Two states re-
cently added statutory clauses stating that:
No mental or emotional disability arising principally out of a bona fide, per-
sonnel action including a transfer, promotion, demotion, or termination ex-
cept such action which is the intentional infliction of emotional harm shall be
deemed to be a personal injury within the meaning of this chapter.'
72
The clause basically insures that normal business practices such as de-
motions, transfers, work evaluations and layoffs, will not result in
mental injury claims so long as the employer acts in good faith. By
enacting a similar clause, the Nebraska legislature could further as-
sure that only legitimate mental-mental claims will be compensated
and that industries and consumers will not bear the costs of everyday
employment stress.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current Nebraska decisions denying workers' compensation bene-
fits for all mental-mental injuries are contrary to the purpose and in-
169. MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 418.401 (West Supp. 1990); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1
(West 1989).
170. NY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.011 (Baldwin Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36
(West 1988); WYo. STAT. § 27-14-102 (Supp. 1990).
171. A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 42.25(a). See also Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1988, at Al,
col. 5.
172. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 1 (West 1988). See also ALASKA STAT.
§ 23.30.265 (Supp. 1989).
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tent of workers' compensation law. The "physical injury"
requirement should be eliminated by statutory amendment, judicial
decision or both. The Sorensen case demonstrates the injustices that
can and will occur if Nebraska continues to deny relief to workers who
were mentally injured by a mental stimulus.
Public policy and precedents from other jurisdictions support the
right of all workers to attempt to recover for mental-mental injuries
through rules of fact. If the workers' compensation system does not
bear the cost of mental injuries, the burden will fall on individual
workers or public welfare systems. In addition, Nebraska's workers
deserve the same protection as employees in other states.
By adopting and establishing rules of fact in mental-mental cases,
the Nebraska legislature and the courts could provide justice for
workers, yet guard against fraudulent claims. A statutory compromise
in the mental injury area would protect both employees and employ-
ers, as well as fulfill the purpose of workers' compensation law. The
statutory compromise generally would leave the loss on the employee,
unless the employee could prove a mental stimulus in the workplace
substantially contributed to the mental injury.
Victoria L. Ruhga '89
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